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DISCRIMINATION BY PROXY 
Larry Alexander* and Kevin Cole** 
I. THE PRINCIPLES 
Here are three well-settled principles of constitutional law: 
The Anti-Discrimination Principle. Government cannot use 
racial classifications, even as the most cost-effective proxies for 
other traits, unless using them as the most cost-effective proxies 
is necessary to further a compelling interest.' (The same holds 
for use of a gender classification as a cost-effective proxy, except 
government's burden is lower: the classification must be sub-
stantially related to an important interest.2) 
The Disparate Impact Principle. A non-racial (or non-
gender) classification that produces a disparate racial (or gen-
der) impact is not forbidden on that ground by itsele 
The Intent Principle. However, a non-racial (or non-
gender) classification adopted as a close proxy for race (or gen-
der)-that is, because of its disparate impact-is assessed the 
same way as an explicit racial (or gender) classification, that is, 
under the Anti-Discrimination Principle.4 
II. THE PROBLEM 
Now consider the admissions policies of three hypothetical 
state-supported law schools in, say, the plains states: 
• Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
•• Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
The authors wish to thank the following for their comments: Suzanna Sherry, Tom 
Smith, and Chris Wonnell. 
1. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
2 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
3. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personnel Administrator of Massa· 
chusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
4. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 
u.s. 252 (1977). 
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School A has admitted students solely on the basis of how 
they score on the LSAT. It has recently discovered that the 
LSAT overpredicts the performance of blacks relative to whites. 
It does not believe that race is causally related to the variation 
between predicted and actual performance; rather, it believes 
that race merely correlates with other factors that are causally 
related to that variation. However, it is unable either to identify 
those factors or to test for them in any way that would be cost-
effective. It determines that classifying LSAT scores on the ba-
sis of the race of the applicant and then discounting the scores of 
all black applicants is the most cost-effective way of improving 
the performance of its entering class. University counsel con-
cludes, however, that such a policy would violate the Anti-
Discrimination Principle. 
School B has historically followed the same admissions 
policy as School A, that is, admitting those with the highest 
LSAT scores. Recently, however, School B has decided for a 
variety of reasons to become a "regional" law school and restrict 
admissions to applicants from the plains states. It expects stu-
dent quality to decline somewhat, at least in the short term, be-
cause of the constriction of the applicant pool. However, it dis-
covers that its incoming students under the new policy, despite a 
lower average LSA T score, are outperforming previous entering 
classes. 
School C, surprised by the news from School B, asks a stat-
istician to analyze School B's policies. The statistician reports 
that the performance of School B's students is due to the fact 
that there are few black applicants to law school in the plains 
states. In the past, most of the white applicants to Schools A, B, 
and C had come from the plains states, but most of the black 
applicants had come from outside the region. Therefore, School 
B's policy, while not as effective in improving performance as 
the racial classification that School A rejected as unconstitu-
tional, is more effective than an unrestricted admissions policy 
based solely on LSAT because it has an effect similar to the re-
jected racial classification. 
School C would like to adopt the "plains states only" ad-
missions policy of School B. Its sole reason is that it believes the 
performance of its students will improve. It asks University 
counsel whether that policy, adopted for that reason, would 
violate the Intent Principle rather than merely come under the 
Disparate Impact Principle. How should University counsel an-
swer? 
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG 
THE PRINCIPLES 
University counsel should begin by analyzing the relation 
among the three principles. The Disparate Impact Principle, al-
though frequently criticized prior to Washington v. Davis,5 is 
now relatively uncontroversial, as it should be. All laws have 
disparate impact along the axes of race, gender, national origin, 
religion, and so on. Unless all laws require a compelling interest 
to justify them- in which case either the nature of a compelling 
interest will be denatured or no set of laws will be constitutional 
except for that set that produces perfect group equality among 
all protected groups and in all respects-disparate impact will 
have to be treated as different constitutionally from racial and 
similar classifications. The Disparate Impact Principle is, there-
fore, unassailable. 
If the Disparate Impact Principle is in place, then the Intent 
Principle is necessary to prevent easy circumvention of the Anti-
Discrimination Principle. If government may not discriminate 
against blacks in the absence of a compelling interest, but it may 
discriminate against a "group" that has a ninety-nine percent 
overlap with "blacks" with only a permissible interest, then the 
Anti-Discrimination Principle will prove ineffective. 
The question University counsel must answer is whether 
School C's adoption of the regional restriction falls under the 
Disparate Impact Principle, in which case it is permissible, or 
under the Intent Principle, in which case it is not. Because the 
Intent Principle is there to prevent circumvention of the Anti-
Discrimination Principle through the Disparate Impact Principle, 
deciding whether this case falls under the Disparate Impact 
Principle or the Intent Principle requires further analysis of the 
Anti-Discrimination Principle. 
IV. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE AND 
TYPES OF RACIAL (AND GENDER) CLASSIFICATIONS 
Understanding the Anti-Discrimination Principle-and 
hence the Disparate Impact and Intent Principles-requires 
asking why government might employ racial and other suspect 
and semi-suspect classifications. The first reason is pure bias: 
the people whose sentiments the government is expressing be-
5. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Dis-
crimination, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1977). 
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lieve that members of the group discriminated against have less 
moral value than the rest of the population. This is a moral be-
lief, which may or may not be accompanied by particular em-
pirical beliefs about the group. 
We take it as axiomatic that human beings do not have dif-
ferential moral worth, or at least that they do not have differen-
tial moral worth because of characteristics other than choices or 
perhaps character traits.6 Therefore, if a racial classification re-
flects the view that an entire racial group is less worthy of gov-
ernmental concern and respect than others, we know the gov-
ernment is acting improperly. 
The expression of pure bias is nonrational discrimination by 
government. But other racial classifications may reflect irra-
tional or rational discrimination. A racial classification might be 
an instance of irrational discrimination if it is based on an em-
pirical judgment about the group discriminated against that is 
either incorrect or correct but insufficiently supportive of the 
classification.7 If the government discriminates against blacks 
because it believes that blacks are more likely than others to 
have some relevant trait T, but in fact blacks are not more likely 
than others to have T, then government has discriminated irra-
tionally. Or, if blacks are more likely than others to have T, but 
there is another classification C that is more probative of T 
and/or cheaper to employ than a racial classification, govern-
ment has again discriminated irrationally. 
On the other hand, if it is true both that blacks are more 
likely to have T and that there is no other classification that is as 
cost-effective as race in identifying those with T, government 
has discriminated rationally. 
Why would we want a constitutional principle such as the 
Anti-Discrimination Principle that forbids rational discrimina-
tion (in the absence of a compelling interest) and not merely ir-
rational and nonrational discrimination? First, we might believe 
that racial discrimination is almost never rational, and that we 
would therefore be wise to pay the cost of forbidding some ra-
tional racial discrimination in order to ensnare nonrational and 
irrational racial discrimination that might otherwise sneak 
through masquerading as rational discrimination.8 
6. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 158-59 (1992). 
7. !d. at 169-70. 
8. !d. at 203-8. 
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Second, we might believe that the overt use of racial classi-
fications has negative side-effects even if it is otherwise rational 
discrimination in the context in which it is employed.9 Negative 
racial attitudes might be reinforced. Members of the group dis-
criminated against might suffer psychically even if not person-
ally affected by the law. Importantly, this justification for the 
Anti-Discrimination Principle does not apply to the covert uses 
of suspect classifications covered by the Intent Principle. 
V. ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM 
We can now see why School B's regional policy is constitu-
tionally legitimate. Having a regional law school is a legitimate 
governmental purpose-or, if not a legitimate governmental 
purpose, a rational means of achieving a variety of legitimate 
governmental purposes-and its disparate racial impact is im-
material, given that the disparate racial impact was not in any 
sense the reason the policy was chosen by School B. 
We can also see why School A would act unconstitutionally 
if it discounted the LSA T scores of blacks. Although doing so 
would rationally further the legitimate governmental purpose of 
increasing law student performance, that purpose is presumably 
not so compelling as to justify a racial classification. Because 
the Anti-Discrimination Principle covers cases of rational as well 
as nonrational and irrational racial discrimination, it forbids 
School A's racial discrimination against blacks. 
What now of School C's regional policy, the policy at issue? 
School C is engaging in rational discrimination against appli-
cants outside the plains region. Region is not a racial or other 
suspect classification. 10 On the other hand, unlike School B, 
School C would not be adopting the policy were it not in some 
sense the case that the policy produces a disparate racial impact. 
For School C, unlike School B, is interested only in improving its 
admittees and not in being regional for any other reason. And it 
is the disparate racial impact that correlates "regional" with 
"better admittees." 
9. ld. at 185-87. 
10. In some circumstances it may be. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 
(1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). 
Notably, the constitutional principles of these cases do not extend to state or re-
gional preferences regarding state-financed benefits such as higher education. See Jona-
than D. Varat, State 'Citizenship' and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 552-54 
(1981). 
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Although it is tempting to view School C's plan as simply 
presenting a disparate impact case (deemed constitutional by 
the Disparate Impact Principle), the plan differs significantly 
from the paradigm case presented by School B 's plan. School 
B's objective is to establish itself as a regional law school. 
Though the plan disparately impacts blacks, the benefits of be-
coming a regional law school are not thought (by School B) to 
derive from disparately impacting blacks, either directly or indi-
rectly.11 
Of course, School C's ultimate goal is not disparately to im-
pact blacks, which would constitute a kind of discriminatory 
purpose, covered by the Intent Principle. However, School C 
does intend to benefit from this disparate impact. 
In terms of their impacts on blacks, the policies of School B 
and School C are thus prototypical examples in the debates over 
the meaning of "purpose." School C has a purpose to impact 
blacks adversely; School B does not. Though School C's ulti-
mate goal is not to harm blacks-that is, it does not seek to 
harm blacks out of racist enjoyment in causing them harm-
School C perceives excluding blacks as a means to its ultimate 
goal. School B, on the other hand, does not have a purpose to 
impact blacks adversely. It simply wants to be a regional law 
school, and it would pursue that goal even if the goal did not 
impact blacks adversely. School B is thus like the killer who 
bombs an airplane prototype in flight in order to delay produc-
tion; under the criminal law, the killer is guilt¥ of knowingly 
killing the pilot, but not of doing so purposely.1 School C, on 
the other hand, is like the killer who bombs the plane to kill the 
pilot, so the killer can take up with the pilot's spouse. The dif-
ference between the schools also is captured by the doctrine of 
11. For example, the school might think it will benefit by becoming a bigger fish in 
a smaller pond; it might think that regionalism will entice regional employers to recruit 
more heavily at the school, or even that student performance will improve if students 
generally perceive that they are going to school with persons they are likely to encoun-
ter frequently in a regional practice. Or the school might think that the regional place-
ment advantages of becoming a regional law school will enhance student performance 
by enticing the best students from the region to remain in the region for law school. 
A different case would exist if School B would not attempt to become a regional law 
school if doing so would not disparately impact blacks. For example, if alumni would 
better financially support a regional law school, but do so only because they were not 
thereby supporting blacks, and if School B were aware of this causal mechanism, then 
we should view School Bas intending to discriminate against blacks (or as intending to 
increase financial support for the school through discriminating against blacks). 
12. Of course, in criminal law, the distinction often will make no difference in 
terms of liability. 
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the double effect, which holds that acting to achieve an act's bad 
consequences is morally different from acting with awareness 
that the bad consequences will result as a byproduct of pursuing 
some other end.I3 
Acting with knowledge that a classification serves its pur-
pose because of its disparate impact differs from the ordinary 
disparate impact cases in the following way: Whenever the clas-
sification ceases to produce as much disparate impact as it did 
originally, the government actor will be motivated to find a new 
classification that more closely correlates with the suspect class. 
In other words, government's classifications will continually 
track suspect ones. In an ordinary disparate impact case-a case 
like Washington v. Davis, for example-the government actor 
will be at worst indifferent to and at best delighted by a decline 
in the disparate impact of the classification. Not so when it un-
derstands that the classification serves the purpose in direct rela-
tion to the degree of disparate impact it produces. 
Should the distinction between a classification that pro-
duces disparate impact as a by-product and one that is chosen 
precisely because of its disparate impact make a constitutional 
difference? Recall the reasons the Anti-Discrimination Princi-
ple encompasses rational as well as nonrational and irrational 
discrimination. First, use of a suspect classification might be so 
rarely rational that its proscription in the absence of a compel-
ling purpose will produce little harm but perhaps prevent some 
otherwise undetected nonrational and irrational uses from 
sneaking past the courts. Second, use of a suspect classification, 
even if rational, may produce psychic and other costs beyond its 
effects on those directly disadvantaged. Do these reasons apply 
to use of a proxy for a suspect classification when the proxy is 
chosen because lt is rational? 
Unlike many of the uses of proxies that fall within the In-
tent Principle, in cases like School C's, the motivation to use the 
proxy ultimately comes not from the proxy's connection to race 
but from its connection to government's ultimate purpose, 
which connection just happens to run through race. 
On the other hand, there is an argument that School C's 
contemplated regional policy falls under the Intent Principle. 
For once School C understands that the regional policy produces 
13. The standard example compares the morality of wartime bombing of a muni-
ti.o~~ plant undertaken with the knowledge it will kill nearby civilians with a plan to kill 
CIVIlians as a means of pressuring the enemy to surrender. 
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better student performance only to the extent the policy pro-
duces a disparate racial impact, School C will be tempted to go 
to policies that have an even greater disparate racial impact. 
Perhaps if School C is in South Dakota, and the Dakotas have 
even fewer black applicants to law schools than Nebraska, 
School A will be tempted to adopt a Dakotas restriction on ad-
mission, at least if the loss of Nebraska whites has less effect 
than the elimination of Nebraska blacks. Again, School Cis ul-
timately concerned with school performance, not racial exclu-
sion per se. But unless rational racial discrimination is exempted 
from the Intent Principle, that should be immaterial. For it is no 
defense to the Anti-Discrimination Principle-which the Intent 
Principle is meant to further-that government is aiming at race 
only because that is the best way to hit a target other than race, 
just as it is no defense to terror bombing that one would gladly 
pursue a different method of winning the war if one were feasi-
ble, and that one truly regrets having to terrorize. The Anti-
Discrimination Principle is not limited to gleeful racial discrimi-
nation. 
Most of the reasons that support the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle arguably support treating School C's plan differently 
from School B's. Because School C perceives that disparate ra-
cial impact is directly responsible for the gains it seeks from the 
regional-school approach, we have reason to be concerned that 
School C may have been too lax in examining the evidence that 
led it to adopt the plan. That is, School C may be too willing to 
embrace the view that discriminating against blacks will increase 
student performance because that view overlaps with pernicious 
stereotypes. Moreover, even if School Cis acting in an entirely 
rational way, knowledge of the connection between race and 
performance may have untoward social effects of a kind that 
School C has little incentive to internalize in assessing the ra-
tionality of discrimination. School C's plan has these effects in a 
less marked way than would School A's plan of an explicit and 
overt racial classification (discounting the LSA T scores of 
blacks). But once School C's plan is challenged, the secret will 
be out, and the untoward social effects will result. Accordingly, 
there is a strong argument that School C's plan should fall under 
the Intent Principle as an effort to evade the thrust of the Anti-
Discrimination Principle. 
Of course, paradigmatic disparate impact cases can present 
some difficulties similar to those presented by School C's case. 
Suppose School D, believing that LSAT scores accurately pre-
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diet student performance, and wishing to achieve a high level of 
student performance, decides to admit students solely on the ba-
sis of LSA T notwithstanding its knowledge that such an ap-
proach will disparately impact blacks. News of this disparate 
impact might well have untoward social effects. But because 
School D is not purporting to benefit by employing race as a 
proxy, any untoward effects that result from the correlation be-
tween race and academic potential have a better chance of re-
flecting reality, not merely School D's theory of reality. Moreo-
ver, because School D does not actually make use of race as a 
proxy, directly or indirectly, the chance is greatly reduced that 
School D is simply acting out of an objectionable desire to harm 
blacks or to vindicate its own misimpressions about blacks. 
Moreover, the typical anti-discrimination case risks a dif-
ferent bad effect. While a black might feel bad upon learning of 
the effect of School D's admissions policy, and might fear that 
others will unjustly assume that she is unqualified for law school 
because of her race, she need not view race as a straitjacket. 
School D is not thinking of any individual black as a black; in-
stead, it views each applicant as an LSA T score. In the absence 
of evidence that the LSAT itself is constructed or employed with 
the purpose to discriminate against blacks, any individual black 
knows that she will be evaluated for admission based on charac-
teristics apart from race. It is surely demoralizing to fear being 
judged according to inapt stereotypes, such as that if one is 
black, one is a poor performer on the LSAT. And disparate im-
pact may lead to such stereotyping. However, it is even more 
demoralizing to fear that meaningful action will be taken based 
on those stereotypes. When a school consciously employs a 
proxy for race, it sends a message, to blacks and whites alike, 
that it is permissible to think racially when making important 
decisions. This is not an effect of the paradigmatic disparate 
impact case. 
This particular side effect of the typical anti-discrimination 
case also will result from School C's admissions policy, at least 
once it is challenged. The racial thinking of School C is some-
what more hidden from view than would be the case if School A 
were to employ its explicit racial classification. But when called 
on to explain its policy, School C will need to admit that it 
adopted the policy because of the way the policy's racial impact 
improves student performance. We will learn that School C 
thought in racial terms and acted to take advantage of such ra-
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cial thinking. Thus, the doctrine of the double effect can be 
viewed, in this context at least, as having a utilitarian face too. 
Now consider School E. Having observed that School B's 
student performance increased when School B became a re-
gional school, but having no idea why, School E adopts a re-
gional-school stance in hopes of increasing student performance. 
That is, School E is like School C in having the same ultimate 
end (to increase student performance), but differs from School 
C in not realizing the causal mechanism that explains the results. 
Is School E sufficiently different from School C to treat the 
plans differently? 
We can feel quite confident that School E is not acting out 
of bias, pronounced or subtle. Its ignorance establishes inno-
cence. And to the extent that untoward social effects are mainly 
the product of social awareness of the link between race and 
goal, that factor is also missing. But placing a premium on igno-
rance is an uncomfortable constitutional position. Moreover, 
once School E becomes aware of why its approach works, the 
morality of its continuing the approach seems virtually indistin-
guishable from the morality of School C's adoption of the policy 
in the first place. 
Whether an actor has a purpose to impact disparately a pro-
tected group will sometimes depend on the state of our knowl-
edge about the world. For example, if we learn that a regional 
strategy improves student performance by screening out those 
who had poor elementary schooling, a school that adopts a re-
gional strategy to improve performance does not have the pur-
pose to impact blacks disparately, even if disparately impacting 
those with poor elementary schooling will also disparately im-
pact blacks. 
There is one category of case, however, in which our state 
of knowledge will not affect our description of the causal 
mechanism by which a particular strategy works. That is the 
category in which a strategy works precisely because it taps 
someone else's noxious attitudes. For example, consider a law 
school that seeks to promote student satisfaction with teaching 
by recruiting and retaining teachers who have received good 
student teaching evaluations. Now assume that these evalua-
tions are skewed because students typically are harder on female 
and minority professors solely because of gender and race. The 
school's scheme will disparately impact women and minorities, 
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and it is likely to succeed in significant part because it feeds its 
own students' noxious preferences for white male professors. 14 
Our tentative conclusion is that the problem of deciding 
whether School C's proposed policy violates the Intent Principle 
is a product of tension between the first two principles. The 
Anti-Discrimination Principle forbids rational racial discrimina-
tion along with nonrational and irrational racial discrimination. 
That is, it forbids using race as a rational means to permissible 
ends. The Disparate Impact Principle, however, allows non-
racial discrimination that closely correlates with racial discrimi-
nation in pursuit of permissible ends. When that correlation is 
direct, so that the non-racial discrimination serves permissible 
ends in direct relation to its correlation with racial discrimina-
tion- the case of School C's regional policy- the two principles 
seem to collide. 15 
It is time, therefore, to rethink the issue of rational dis-
crimination. The problem we have illustrated is not merely hy-
pothetical, we suspect. Many classifications that correlate with 
race or sex may further permissible objectives because of that 
correlation rather than despite it. In those cases, demanding 
that government ignore race and sex but also act rationally will 
be demanding the impossible. 
14. See Alexander, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 173-76 (cited in note 6). See also note 11. 
15. This at least apparent collision of the two principles explains the reaction we 
have gotten when we have described the problem of School C's admissions policy to 
others. Most people deemed the constitutionality of that policy to be an easy question. 
Half of them believed the policy was clearly constitutional, while the other half believed 
the policy was clearly unconstitutional. We take that reaction to be strong evidence that 
the question is not an easy one under current constitutional jurisprudence. 
